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The aim of this introductory conceptual paper is twofold, a) to clarify the relevance of the 
issue of public values for public management, especially with regard to infrastructure-based 
polices; and b) to offer conceptual clarification and the broad outlines of a common 
framework in order to facilitate and stimulate a meaningful and insightful debate during the 
panel session on the various papers that will follow. 
 
 
1. Introduction and historical context 
 
In today’s world, governments are usually assumed to have the responsibility of providing 
public infrastructure (Demetriades and Mamuneas, 2000; Lall, 2004). After the Second World 
War, governments increasingly assumed the role of direct providers of public infrastructure 
with a view to supporting national development and economic expansion (Ikenberry, 2000),  
largely as a result of Keynesian economics dominating the western industrial policy agenda 
(Maier, 1977; Colander, 2000). The acceptance of this school of economic thought provided 
governments with a clear and unequivocal mandate for building critical infrastructure such as 
railroads, roads, ports, dams and airports, in addition to providing essential public services 
such as the provision of electricity, water, telecommunications, public transport and air travel. 
Public values, it is clear, were inherent in the provision of these public goods. Indeed, 
there was an implicit assumption that public interest was served by public ownership of these 
vital assets and services, and, as a concomitant, that their separation from private 
administration would ensure that the public good did not have to compete with economic 
interest, especially rent-seeking activity on the part of private concerns. Some of these public 
values included equal access to public goods, the cross-subsidization of disadvantaged 
communities, economic growth as a means of achieving higher living standards, and public 
control of assets, with significant national security implications when associated with strategic 
infrastructure sectors such as telecommunications, banking and transport (Salmenkaita and 
Salo, 2002; Wade, 2003). 
This situation was maintained for the best part of three decades. A significant policy shift, 
however, emerged in the 1980s. Keynesian economics, as a rationale for an interventionist 
role for government, was replaced by neo-classical economics, a body of thought which 
challenged the proportion of national activity undertaken by the public sector vis-à-vis the 
private sector (Schipke, 2001; Zohlnhöfer and Obinger, 2006). The result was the large-scale 
shift of assets and activities from the public sector to the private sector through policy 
mechanisms such as privatization, contracting out, and public sector downsizing (Nestor and 
Mahboodi, 1999; Megginson and Netter, 2001). An important feature of this policy change 
was the transfer of capital from the public sector to the private sector, particularly through 
taxation transfers (Ahrend and Winograd, 2006). 
Thus, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, most liberal democratic governments 
around the world are confronted with the dilemma of being held responsible for the provision 
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of major infrastructure, but not having the revenue base to construct or maintain assets at the 
level expected by the public. Furthermore, these assets are still often regarded as public assets. 
As a result, they are subjected to the similar public values of previous decades such as 
equitable access, the provision of broader social benefits and the contribution of critical 
infrastructure. To further complicate matters, other public values have assumed a new 
prominence in public debates. The most salient of these include greater environmental 
sustainability and broader community engagement, in addition to international 
responsibilities, especially with respect to humanitarian concerns and peace-keeping activities 
(Besley and Ghatak, 2001; Lane, 2000). 
In view of the above, governments have had to respond to increased demands for new 
forms of public infrastructure in the fields of energy, transport, telecommunications, health 
and national security within the political context of economic systems requiring the 
minimalization of government revenues. This is especially the case given that many 
governments have also privatized profitable enterprises (Quiggin, 2002). The most common 
response has been to find new ways of attracting private capital into areas of public 
infrastructure, especially where government is no longer able to provide the required funding 
(Harris, 2003). One of the better known phenomena that have arisen as a result are public-
private partnerships (PPPs), whereby arrangements are made that serve the interests of both 
the private sector and the government, ostensibly acting on behalf of the general public 
(Hodge and Greve, 2005; Van Ham and Koppenjan, 2001). 
A new dilemma emerges relating to the extent to which public values can be maintained 
within a framework of increased private sector ownership of critical infrastructure. Of course, 
it is reasonable to assume that private ownership will have profit as its primary motive. Yet it 
is important to bear in mind that, prima facie, many public values such as equitable access, 
environmental sustainability and cross-subsidization will detract from efficient rent-taking, at 
least from a short- to medium-term perspective. That the objectives of private companies 
providing public goods are often in conflict with broader social, economic, political or 
environmental objectives has been well documented (Shiva, 2002; Van Slyke, 2003; Sclar, 
2000). On the other hand, the production and distribution of vital foodstuffs such as bread, at 
least in modern society, remains in private hands. Yet this state of affairs is not viewed as a 
major threat to public health. In such cases, therefore, private ownership is not considered to 
be at odds with public values. The latter will be protected not by ownership but by other 
mechanisms. 
This paper is concerned with examining this issue with a view to identifying possibilities 
for resolving conflicts between the private provision of public infrastructure and the 
maintenance of public values. The starting point of this analysis is the provision of detailed 
definitions regarding the most salient components of the debate. In the next section, the way 
in which public values can be identified and thence defined will be discussed. Three 
approaches to public values will be outlined in order to provide a theoretical framework for 
discussion. An examination of existing and enhanced arrangements designed to safeguard 
public values follows, while the concluding section of this paper presents issues for further 
debate and builds upon the findings of the earlier sections.  
 
 
2. Defining public values 
 
It is important to ask the following question: when does a value qualify as a ‘public value’ as 
opposed to a ‘private’ one? For a value to be denominated ‘public’, it is argued that there has 
to be a collectivity, i.e., an aggregation level that can benefit from the protection of the value 
in question (De Bruijn and Dicke, 2006). ‘Private’ values, on the other hand, are equated with 
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particular interests. These private, and therefore particular, values might well be contrasted 
with collective benefit (Weintraub, 1997, p. 5). The opposite of ‘public’ is that which pertains 
only to the individual. 
The reasoning, be it implicit or explicit, that a value is only public if a collectivity 
benefits from it is common to all analyses of public values (De Bruijn and Dicke, 2006). Yet 
the way in which the line is drawn precisely between public and private values differs widely 
in practice. For example, that which is defined as a public value in a utility sector in one 
country may be labelled as a private value in the same sector elsewhere. The distinction may 
also be temporal. By way of example, that which is labelled a public value at one period of 
time may be defined as private in another decade. On the other hand, public values may 
themselves change over time. For example, earlier Christian theology maintained that the 
earth and all living things were given to humankind by God, not in order to safeguard, but to 
use for whatever purposes were deemed necessary. By the late twentieth century, it emerged 
that this philosophy, embraced by much of the Western world, had been manifestly 
detrimental to the planet’s health. The public value pertaining to the natural environment 
shifted from absolute utilitarianism to protectionism and sustainability. The main point, 
therefore, is that ‘public’ carries many meanings, as Weintraub (1997) points out. According 
to one meaning, ‘public’ is equated with state administration. Thus ‘public’ is contrasted with 
‘market economy’. Yet ‘public’ can also mean ‘community/ citizenship.’ In the latter use, 
public is contrasted with private, as in ‘private interests.’ 
Some public values are more resilient than others. For example, accessible and good-
quality public health is a public value that would be difficult to erode, as would accessible and 
low-cost telecommunications. Yet other public values have indeed been compromised in the 
wake of recent events. For example, the public value of free speech has taken several blows as 
a result of growing concerns associated with militant Islamic fundamentalism, and terrorist 
activity in general. For example, sedition laws were recently passed in Australia (part of the 
Anti-Terrorism Bill of 2005). At face value, these laws serve to deter the expression of 
thoughts that may inspire hate, anti-social behaviour and possible loss of life, yet they have 
the potential to fetter, in some way, the public expression of individual thought. On account of 
public hysteria related to terrorism promoted by the media, large sections of society have 
thought the revitalized laws of little moment, and indeed a welcome initiative designed to 
safeguard other public values, such as the preservation of life and public order. 
These different conceptions of ‘the public’ result in very different interpretations of 
public values (Dicke, 2001, pp. 55–60). This is the reason that certain values are, in one 
country, considered a public value worth defending in earnest, whereas, in other countries, the 
very same value might be labelled a private value. While the concept of ‘public values’ is 
used without being questioned in mainstream political debates, a highly contested notion 
emerges in the broader literature concerning this topic.  
 
2.1. Three approaches to public values 
Different scholars and disciplines have sought to define public values. The literature on public 
values is broad. This is especially so when perspectives used in institutional economics, law, 
public administration, and even environmental law, are taken into account. Indeed, an 
immense landscape of theories and terminologies arises. Concepts used include ‘services of 
general interest’ (EC, 2004), ‘public values’ (e.g., Moore, 1995; Jørgensen and Bozeman, 
2002), ‘public objectives’ (e.g., Noam, 1996), ‘public interests’ (e.g., Blumstein, 1999), 
‘externalities’ (e.g., Ostrom et al., 1999, Michie, 1997), and ‘public norms’ (ECN SEO, 
2004), to name only a few. Even when authors use the same concepts, they can mean very 
different things. So, there is a clear need for conceptual clarification. In the following section, 
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the paper will seek to clarify the issue by presenting three theoretical approaches towards 
public values. 
2.1.1. The universalistic approach: abstract level, no trade-offs 
The universalistic approach suggests that public values are universal values that affect 
citizens. As a consequence, these values should be protected by governments. Economists, for 
example, refer to the production of collective or merit goods that are not, or else 
insufficiently, delivered by markets, in addition to the (negative) externalities of economic 
activities, especially when social costs are not internalized in the economic transactions 
between private actors (Pigou, 1952; Bovenberg, Teulings and Van Dalen, 2003; Knowledge 
Center for Economic Regulation, 2004). Different authors make use of this approach. A study, 
for example, of public values in public administration and organizational science literature 
resulted in an overview of more then 70 public values (Beck, Jorgensen and Bozemann, 
2003). 
Public values sometimes refer to substantive conditions such as ‘safety’, ‘public health’ 
or ‘protection of the environment’. In academic discussions of public values that warrant 
protection, especially in the case of privatized public infrastructures, values such as quality of 
service, universal access, low prices, certainty of service delivery and protection of the 
customer are often mentioned. With regard to these values, there is often no mention of a 
trade-off between values, or the means by which the values in question should be 
operationalized. Instead, the list of values is abstract and regarded as universally applicable 
for all places, and for all parties involved. 
Some authors do not refer to substantive values. Instead, they make reference to process-
related issues, i.e., ‘how should a public organization behave?’, or else ‘how should an 
organization that provides public services behave?’ The public values mentioned in this 
context, therefore, are integrity, openness, accountability, etc. For example, Bozeman’s ‘cloud 
of public values’ (2002) mainly consists of values that concern the way in which an 
organization should behave. 
The universalistic approach to public values has an affinity with the natural law 
perspective, which contends that individual human beings have certain inalienable rights in 
accordance with nature (Lasswell and McDougal, 1992; Passerin d’Entrèves, 1994). Public 
values, at least from this perspective, are rights that should be provided for by government. 
Individuals should also have recourse to legal procedures should these rights be infringed 
upon. The universalistic approach, therefore, suggests that public values are objective, 
universal and, what is more, absolute, and that they should be safeguarded, especially by 
means of laws and regulations. One issue that should obviously be raised is the degree to 
which certain public values might be regarded as ‘universal’. Indeed, can public values be 
defined objectively, and at an abstract level? This paper promotes the view that public values 
are intrinsically relative, a view which will be discussed further in the following section. 
 
2.1.2. The stakeholder approach: public value definition as political process 
The stakeholder approach suggests that public values are intersubjective constructions that are 
the result of political debate and negotiation processes between actors who are  involved in or 
affected by a policy or public project (Van Gestel et al., 2007). 
Stakeholders, according to this approach, may agree on certain values as long as they are 
formulated at an abstract level. For example, no politician would oppose, as a matter of 
principle, improved public safety or improved environmental health. When, however, public 
values have to be realized in concrete policy processes, they need to be operationalized in 
concrete choices. These choices have implications for the way in which public values are 
brought into practice, in addition to the extent to which they inform decision-making 
processes. The operationalization of these abstract values may have specific implications for 
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stakeholders. For example, the promotion of renewable energy accords with the abstract value 
of promoting environmental health, yet very few people would approve of a wind-farm being 
built across the road, especially from an aesthetic or noise perspective. 
In the process of operationalizing public values, a vast array of values have to be attended 
to at the same time, even though time and resources may be scarce. As a result, public value 
trade-offs generally have to be made. The first trade-off is between the realization of public 
values and the costs that have to be incurred in order to realize it. For example, if a electricity 
system is designed in such a way that the certainty of delivery is maximized, the system will 
probably become prohibitively expensive. So, in practice, maximum delivery security will not 
be attempted. The first trade-off to be made, in this particular instance, is between a public 
value and cost efficiency. 
The second trade-off is between one public value and other public values. In the case of 
water management in Australia, for example, policy makers are facing the question of 
whether the provision of further critical infrastructure, i.e., a dam, in order to secure public 
water supplies is more important than the preservation of natural habitats and ecosystems. 
Likewise, policy makers may need to decide whether the preservation of an endangered 
species on a particular site is more important than the provision of a major roadway that has 
the potential to improve public amenity and boost local economies. Thus, with increasing 
attention being paid to environmental protection as a public value, impacts to species other 
than homo sapiens are now taken into consideration. Yet even this public value, i.e., the right 
of living creatures not to be plunged into extinction or have their habitats destroyed, is not 
always accorded the same degree of salience as other public values such as job creation, 
economic growth, financial security and societal progress. What is more, this value may not 
shared (to the same degree at least) by all parties in a trade-off situation. This scenario is 
especially important with regard to the provision of infrastructure, which, on account of its 
intrusiveness, necessarily impacts the physical world and its ecosystems. During the 
implementation of a policy or project, actors involved will be involved in a process of ‘pulling 
and pushing’ with respect to the prioritization of public values. In this interaction game, trade-
offs are either negotiated or imposed. 
In cases where public values necesitate a trade-off, these values “are, by definition, never 
static”, but always in motion (De Bruijn and Dicke, 2006, p. 721). Views as to what 
protection a public value deserves in relation to another value are thus constantly in motion 
and influenced by all sorts of factors. Incidents and disasters, in particular, can change the 
nature of the trade-offs made. Constant checks of natural gaspipes in homes are inconvenient 
and will mostly be rejected by tenants and other parties involved. Yet an explosion as a result 
of inadequately maintained pipes leads to immediate calls for more safety and checks. To use 
a not so hypothetical example, the September 11 terrorist attacks, as stated above, have led to 
more rigorous security at airports, even though public convenience has been undermined. 
Freedom of speech, regarded as an important public value in the Western world, has also been 
attenuated, with a recent case in Australia of a man being refused entry onto a Qantas flight 
because he wore a t-shirt condemning George W. Bush as “a terrorist” (BBC, 2007). Yet most 
passengers accept the new state of affairs as preferable to further incidence of airborne 
terrorism, even though much of it constitutes a kind of placebo effect (Barnes et al., 2007). 
So, the prioritization of public values is not static, and trade-offs may change or be 
appreciated differently over time. 
In sum, the stakeholder approach states that public values are not universal, absolute or 
static. Rather, they a) emerge as a result of stakeholder interaction, b) need to be specified 
during the process of implementation, and c) result in trade-offs. In light of this, the crucial 
question is the manner in which public values, in practice, might best be operationalized, and 
the way in which trade-offs are made. Important, too, is the way in which these complex 
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processes are influenced by safeguarding mechanisms that aim to ensure mutually satisfactory 
outcomes. 
 
2.1.3. The institutional perspective: differences in time and place matter 
The institutional perspective agrees with the stakeholder perspective in that public values are 
not universal. Yet, according to this perspective, public values do not emerge coincidently as 
a result of interaction between a set of stakeholders. Actors are embedded in an institutional 
environment, while their behaviours and rationalities are constrained and shaped by the 
structural and cultural characteristics of these environments (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Ostrom, 1996; March and Olsen, 1989; Van Gestel, 2005). Perceptions of public values, as a 
consequence, are sector, culture and time specific. By way of example, what is considered a 
public value in the water sector may be regarded a private value in the world of ICT. In 
addition, the trade-offs that are produced will inevitably differ according to the sector, the 
national context, or even the historical circumstances. 
The institutional perspective, therefore, examines public values, trade-offs and 
safeguarding mechanisms as an expression of the specific institutional characteristics of a 
certain sector or country. This can be achieved, for instance, by using a comparative research 
design. 
 
2.2. Statements for debate 
If one chooses to follow the reasoning of the stakeholder and institutional perspectives, 
research will need to address a number of questions. The more important of these are as 
follows: 
a) how are trade-offs realized in specific infrastructural sectors or projects?; 
b) how should we judge these trade-offs?; 
c) what role do safeguarding mechanisms play?; and 
d) which lessons can be drawn with regard to safeguarding mechanisms? 
 
 
3. Safeguarding public values 
 
The three approaches to public values discussed above, viz., the universalistic approach, the 
stakeholder approach and the institutional perspective, suggest different ways of safeguarding 
public values. In the following section of this paper, problems will be identified and research 
directions established. 
 
3.1. The universal approach: why hierarchy does not work 
In practice, the fear that public values cannot be maintained in a framework of private 
ownership often results in the suggestion that these values should be safeguarded by clearly 
defining them and laying them down in unambiguous and enforceable laws and regulations 
(De Bruijn and Dicke, 2006). Despite this, there are several reasons why this hierarchical 
reaction, which is typical for the universalistic approach, is inadequate. These need to be 
discussed. 
First, hierarchy leads to unintended and unwanted prioritization of values. If some 
interests are clearly defined and specified in concrete, perhaps even quantitative performance 
indicators, other values that are more difficult to specify will receive less attention. As a 
result, the realized trade-offs may be skewed in favour of the interests of particular 
stakeholder groups. For example, if an energy company is held accountable for low prices, 
investment in environmental innovation, itself reflective of a public value, will probably lag 
behind. As a further example of strategic behaviour, Australian bioethanol lobbyists 
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successfully put pressure on the Australian federal government to place an excise of 38.143 
cents per litre on cheaper foreign ethanol in order to safeguard the emergent Australian 
industry (Webb, 2006). Yet Australian bioethanol, currently exempt from excise (although 
this will be phased in from 2011), is heavily subsidized, to the tune of 38.143 cents per litre. 
This, of course, means that petrol blended with bioethanol (usually E10) is sold at generally 
the same price as conventional petrol. 
Second, during the process of implementation of a policy or the operation of a facility, 
operational managers make day-to-day decisions by which they balance the set of diverging 
and conflicting public values that need to be taken into account. On the basis of their 
professional knowledge and discretionary power, they consequently look for ways to 
coordinate the policy requirements and make the system work. By specifying values at the 
policy level, the discretionary powers of professionals are reduced. As a result, there is a 
decreased possibility of effecting workable trade-offs. 
Third, hierarchy leads to the juridification of relations. If public values are considered to 
be rights, and thus laid down in formal laws and traditional regulations, stakeholders have 
incentives to have recourse to the law in order to secure their rights. This is especially true if 
policies leave little room for deliberation and compromise during the implementation and 
operation phases, which, of course, only serves to hinder the realization of local trade-offs that 
would otherwise come about as a result of stakeholder interaction. Legal procedures, in sum, 
are inevitably tardy, expensive and generally result in suboptimal outcomes (at least across 
the board) for all stakeholders. 
Fourth, hierarchy evokes strategic behaviour. The possibilities to force implementing 
agents or (private) operators to realize specified performance indicators are generally 
overestimated. For instance, punctual service provision by a private rail company needs to be 
specified in concrete agreements. The Dutch minister of transport and Dutch Railways may 
agree that 80 per cent of trains have to arrive on time. However, in realizing this relatively 
straightforward requirement, different interpretations may ensue. For example, Dutch 
Railways measures the number of trains that arrive on time. Yet only the number of delays are 
counted, while cancelled services are not registered. This, of course, incensed ROVER, the 
organization representing commuter interests, since the cancellation of trains, in the eyes of 
passengers, is even more vexing than those that are merely delayed.  On account of principle-
agent relations, operators will play with the numbers and, in practice, make different trade-
offs to what policy makers might expect. As a result of information asymmetry (Barnes et al., 
2007), policy makers will prove unable to correct this practice and will become involved in an 
ongoing game of cat-and-mouse. 
Since relationships between government and privatized infrastructures are not exclusively 
hierarchical, but are a complex mix of hierarchy, networks and markets, hierarchy, it might 
well be argued, is not the most appropriate way to safeguard public values. Other 
safeguarding mechanisms emerge as necessary. 
 
3.2. The stakeholder approach: facilitating trade-offs 
According to the stakeholder approach, safeguarding mechanisms should facilitate the 
development of workable trade-offs among all the parties involved in the decision-making 
process. Yet the specification of public values in laws and regulations is perhaps not the best 
way to accomplish this. Instead, it will be argued, a mix of juridical, market and network 
instruments is required. 
  
3.2.1. The role of laws and regulations 
In a stakeholder approach, laws and regulations still play an important role. At this level, 
public values are articulated in order to create a common and accessible framework. This 
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framework guides the behaviour of governments, firms, consumers and interest groups 
involved in the realization of trade-offs during the implementation of policies regarding 
infrastructure, in addition to the operation of the infrastructures themselves. This framework 
thus triggers societal debate, which may indirectly influence the behaviour, for instance, of 
private companies. This is especially the case if there is strategic gain, such as enhanced 
reputational capital (Sveiby, 1997; Petrick et al., 1999; Rodgers, 2003), to be had as a result 
of making trade-offs that will appease interest groups, peak organizations and governments 
(De Bruijn and Dicke, 2006). In addition, this approach also offers a default-option in case the 
trade-offs that actors realize in their interactions are not deemed acceptable.  
 
3.2.2. Market mechanisms  
Contracts and tender procedures offer opportunities for governments to safeguard public 
values. Still, as is the case for laws and regulations, these instruments have comparable 
limitations when used to enforce public values in a unilateral fashion. Much, it seems, 
depends on the quality of the interaction that underlies contract deals and the way in which 
these deals are internalized and supported by the parties involved. 
Market mechanisms also include the use of competition (De Bruijn and Dicke, 2006). 
This instrument is successfully used when private companies start competing during the 
process of realizing public values. This happens in the Netherlands with regard to the supply 
of green energy. In these cases, it is up to government to promote demand for these services. 
By providing subsidies or fiscal facilities for companies, government is able to stimulate 
companies to invest in these new market opportunities. 
 
3.2.3. Networks mechanisms: interaction regarding public values 
Parties involved in the construction, operation and regulation of public infrastructures 
generally operate in a setting in which hierarchy, market and networks co-exist. In these 
settings, parties are usually highly autonomous, but also interdependent. Interaction will thus 
be important with regard to articulating public values and realizing trade-offs. Public values 
also have to be negotiated. The quality of the trade-offs realized in this way, it follows, 
depends upon the quality of the interaction processes. 
For governments, the use of network arrangements implies the creation of a level playing 
field, the use of arrangements and management options in order to initiate and facilitate 
interactions, and the coordination of these interactions and their outcomes with existing laws 
and policies. 
 
3.3. The institutional approach: contingent strategies 
The institutional approach claims that the choice of safeguarding instruments cannot be based 
on generic ideas about how to safeguard public values, but depends, rather, on the existing 
institutional practices and value systems. These value systems and practices will constrain and 
shape the choices made regarding trade-offs and safeguarding mechanisms (March and Olsen, 
1989; Goodin, 1996). 
Effective safeguarding mechanisms will necessarily differ over time, and in different 
institutional contexts. Therefore, the specific interaction-setting, in addition to the physical or 
technical characteristics of the infrastructure in question, largely determines the 
appropriateness of the regulation mechanisms employed. These mechanisms should also be 
informed by the broader set of institutions at hand and the informal rules, habits and beliefs of 
the actors involved, in addition to those of the wider community. This insight, it follows, also 
implies that the possibility of transplanting best practices with respect to safeguarding public 
values to other environments is limited. Indeed, what works in one setting will not necessarily 
be effective in another (De Jong, 1999). 
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3.4. Statements for debate 
It is worth articulating three statements that might serve to engender debate on these 
important issues. These are as follows:  
e) the standard reaction, i.e., specifying public values in laws and regulations and enforcing 
them, is inadequate on its own; 
f) there is a fundamental need for safeguarding arrangements that, according to the 
stakeholder approach, facilitate the interaction between stakeholders and aim to bring 
about workable trade-offs; and  
g) both the content of these safeguarding mechanisms and the (institutional) conditions that 
underlie them require further research and practical elaboration. 
 
4. Moving further forward: issues for debate 
 
Based on the above conceptual and normative reflections on public values, trade-offs and 
safeguarding mechanisms, a number of salient issues that warrant further discussion—and 
indeed more detailed research—emerge. 
First of all, there is a clear need to arrive at theoretical, conceptual and methodological 
clarifications pertaining to the conceptualization of public values in the context of public 
infrastructures and concomitant service delivery. In particular, it is important to consider a) 
the way in which these speak to the idea of ‘common interest’, b) the means by which public 
values can be identified and captured, and c) the way in which public values can be 
distinguished from more clearly context-specific stakeholder interests. 
Second, and with respect to the problems outlined above, it would be useful to identify 
the public values that are generally at stake in specific infrastructure-based service delivery, 
and which ones are often downplayed during the process of negotiation. This would shed 
further light on the issue of whether a universal set of values exist, or whether public values 
are contingent and emerging depending on the nature of the infrastructure project, the 
institutional setting, or else happenstance, in addition to public debate and the external 
political climate of the day (which, of course, can be affected by an agenda-setting media). 
Third, an ongoing international study of these considerations would lead to greater 
understanding of the operationalization of public values in the context of infrastructure 
provision and ongoing service delivery. In particular, the notion of trade-offs requires further 
work in order to determine the extent to which trade-offs, and indeed the type and nature of 
these trade-offs, are project-, sector- or nation-specific. This done, some kind of explanation is 
required. 
Fourth, there is a need to determine the way in which trade-offs should be judged. In 
particular, is it possible to distinguish between good and bad trade-offs? Which criteria 
underlie these judgements? Perhaps it is problematic to qualify ‘good’ and ‘bad’ trade-offs. 
What is more, identification of the persons or institutions possessing the competence to do so 
remains challenging. 
Fifth, the efficacy of safeguarding mechanisms needs to be ascertained. This would 
involve analysing existing safeguarding arrangements. One useful approach could be to 
determine the degree to which they are context specific. Another important question relates to 
whether such mechanisms allow stakeholders to realize workable trade-offs between 
conflicting public values at stake, and whether they further the realization of desirable trade-
offs and militate against less desirable ones. The latter body of work would lead to the 
identification of optimal and sub-optimal practices with regard to arrangements meant to 
safeguard public interests, though the criteria that might be used to assess success and failure 
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